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Abstract
We conduct a field experiment with elementary school children to go to the roots
of the gender gap in financial participation and decision-making. We study the com-
bined effects of two treatments designed to boost the attention span of participants in
completing a basic financial task. We find that the use of gender-specific conceptual
frames (competitiveness vs. cooperation) in the description of the task: a) raises girls’
interest and thus increases their number of coherent answers; b) makes the transmis-
sion of information on the utility of savings more effective in boosting the coherence of
girls’ answers; c) does not increase girls’ level of impatience. This evidence supports
our underlying hypothesis that the use of more gender-specific conceptual frames in
presenting financial information to women may play a role in narrowing the gender
gap in financial market participation and decision-making.
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1. Introduction
The gender gap in financial participation and decision-making has been extensively doc-
umented in the economics, psychology and sociology literature. For instance, it has been
demonstrated that women are rarely primary decision-makers when it comes to savings
and investment decisions. Fonseca et al. (2012) find that, when talking about making long-
term spending and saving plans, 26.2% of women versus 33.8% of men declare that they are
the primary decision-makers in their households. Similarly, when talking about tracking
investments and insurance coverage, these percentages are 32.8% versus 49.2%. A num-
ber of studies highlight some potential determinants of this phenomenon (see Lusardi and
Mitchell 2014 for an exhaustive overview). First of all, women are, on average, more risk-
averse than men (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Eckel and Grossman 2002, 2008; Niederle
and Vesterlund 2007; Croson and Gneezy 2009; Dohmen et al. 2011). Second, women are on
average less financially literate as well as less confident in their own capabilities than men.
Evidence that women have lower scores on financial literacy tests than men is found in
Lusardi and Mitchell (2008), Guiso et al. (2008), Fornero and Monticone (2011), van Rooij et
al. (2011) and Bucher-Koenen et al. (2017), whereas evidence of a gender gap in measured
and self-assessed financial literacy is found in Barber and Odean (2001), Eckel and Gross-
man (2002), van Rooij et al. (2007), Arano et al. (2010), and Mahdavi and Horton (2014).1
Third, social roles, cultural norms and/or specialization processes inside the family may
prevent women from engaging in financial activities (Fonseca et al. 2012; Bucher-Koenen
et al. 2017). Finally, Boggio et al. (2018) point out how the language of investor commu-
nication, by privileging masculine linguistic domains, may generate in women feelings of
unfamiliarity towards this type of specialized discourse (see Gotti 2003, 2011, for a defi-
1See Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) for a detailed review about how the patterns of financial literacy are af-
fected by age, sex, education and ability, income and work status, race and ethnicity, and family background.
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nition of specialized discourse and an analysis of the features of technical as opposed to
common language).
By elaborating on the last point, this article investigates whether gender-specific con-
ceptual frames impact on the level of attention that women and men devote to the comple-
tion of a basic financial task aimed at eliciting their time preferences. Limited attention is a
well-known behavioral bias that undermines the quality of investors’ decisions (Kahneman
1973; Corwin and Coughenour 2008; DellaVigna and Pollet 2009). The present study veri-
fies whether limited attention correlates with the framing of the problem at hand and with
the respondents’ gender. In particular, we investigate whether the use of gender-specific
conceptual frames may spark people’s interest in the task they are required to perform,
make them focus more on its completion, and improve the consistency of their answers.
The task consists in filling out a multiple price list aimed at eliciting individual discount
rates (see Coller and Williams 1999 and Harrison et al. 2002 for the basic design and first
applications). We choose such a task for a number of reasons. First, it allows to clearly tell
apart those who provide coherent answers from those who do not. Second, the relation
between intertemporal preferences and interest rates as embedded in a multiple price list
task is at the core of basic financial knowledge and it is well-known that the latter corre-
lates positively with financial participation (Guiso and Jappelli 2005; van Rooij et al. 2011).
Third, the quality of financial decisions depends heavily on the characteristics of agents’
underlying time preferences. If individuals display inconsistent time preferences or fail to
elicit them correctly through introspection, they are more likely to incur in bad investment
decisions and consequently further limit their participation in financial markets. Indeed,
Meier and Sprenger (2013) show that time preferences are highly correlated with financial
information acquisition and financial participation. They also use a multiple price list task
and report that less patient individuals, and to some extent also those who display inco-
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herent time preferences, are less likely to participate to financial education programs and
financial markets. Similarly, Jacobson and Petrie (2009) show that inconsistent choices and
mistakes correlate with suboptimal behavior in financial decisions.
We run a field experiment aimed at eliciting participants’ discount rates and propensity
to save. The experiment targets a sample of third and fourth graders (aged 8 and 9) from
five different elementary schools in the metropolitan area of Turin, Italy. Why do we target
young children? The main reason is that they have been much less exposed than adults
to socio-cultural conditioning factors potentially determining the gender gap in financial
participation.2 To be more specific, the choice of age group was dictated by our ambition
to go to the roots of the gender gap by minimizing all the potential determinants deriving
from socialization, the process by which human infants begin to acquire the skills neces-
sary to perform as functioning members of society (Billingham 2007; Burusic et al. 2012).
Inasmuch as socialization is the process through which human beings learn and come to
understand the norms and expectations that serve as organizing devices in society, it is
also a mean of constructing (stereo)typical social roles with specific capabilities and dispo-
sitions, including economic and financial ones.
We use a frame analysis approach to reinforce the theory that during the process of
socialization human beings learn to give meaning to reality according to a set of concep-
tual frames (Goffman 1974). These conceptual frames are not intentional and originate in
daily routines and customs without an awareness that they are such, and that they could
have been different (Verloo and Lombardo 2007). In other words, they are what Gadamer
(1960) defines “prejudices”, that is socially constructed cultural filters through which hu-
man beings become aware of, understand and interpret reality. Thus it is through concep-
2See Lusardi et al. (2010) for evidence of a gender gap in financial literacy among young adults (i.e.,
college graduates), and Lusardi et al. (2014) for evidence of a gender gap among individuals over the age of
50. In this respect, the fact that our experiment targets Italian pupils is particularly interesting: the 2015 PISA
financial literacy assessment (OECD 2017) shows that, out of a sample of 10 OECD countries, Italy is the only
one in which boys perform better than girls already at the age of 15.
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tual frames that we perceive certain activities, tasks and responsibilities as male or female
(see Niederle and Vesterlund 2007 for a discussion of the factors that lead parents, teachers
and peers to encourage gender-typed activities in children). Moreover, since language is of
fundamental importance in children becoming competent members of society, conceptual
frames are produced and reproduced through discursive practices (Fairclough 1992).
In the experiment, we study the (combined) effects of two different treatments designed
to boost the attention span of participants and henceforth referred to as the “Framing Treat-
ment” and the “Workshop Treatment”. The first treatment (the Framing Treatment) is based
on economic, psychological and linguistic studies that rely on “framing theory” (e.g. Goff-
man 1974; Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Tannen 1993; Lakoff 1996; Fillmore and Baker
2009) and is characterized by its intuitiveness and gender-specificity. The treatment exerts
leverage on an instinctive reaction in that it arouses the interest of participants by suggest-
ing some possible uses for the prizes (colorful balloons) that they may win by completing
a certain task.3 More specifically, we exploit the well-documented (stereo)typical concep-
tual dichotomy of competitive men and cooperative women (Akerlof and Kranton 2000;
Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Eckert 2013; Buser et al. 2014). Evolutionary psychologists
and experimental economists have both demonstrated that, from an early age, boys spend
more time at competitive games than girls, whereas girls often select games that have no
clear end point or no winner (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Buser et al. 2014; Niederle
2014). This means that these two opposite conceptual frames, i.e. competitive men vs. co-
operative women, come into play in the process of socialization at an early stage. In line
with this hypothesis, we ask the children to complete a standard task aimed at eliciting
their time preferences (see Bettinger and Slonim 2007; Andersen et al. 2008; Castillo et al.
3See Chang and Burns (2005) for a discussion of children’s motivation in relation to attention skills, and
Kahneman (1973) who postulates that the amount of attention capacity depends on the individual’s level of
arousal.
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2011; Sutter et al. 2013; Alan and Ertac 2018). The task instructions are not difficult to un-
derstand – third and fourth graders already have enough cognitive abilities to comprehend
them – but the task requires them to concentrate long enough to provide answers that are
consistent (i.e., non-contradictory). To possibly impact on the children’s attentiveness in
completing it, we use three alternative conceptual frames. The first focuses on competi-
tiveness and physical abilities, thus emphasizing (stereo)typical masculine characteristics.
The second focuses on cooperation and empathy, thus emphasizing (stereo)typical femi-
nine characteristics. The third is neutral, and uses no gender-specific connotation. Most
importantly, in our experiment framing does not affect the description of the task per se,
but rather the description of its outcome. On this, we elaborate on the insights of Becker
and Mulligan (1997), who state that inducing people to think about the utility that derives
from future consumption encourages them to become more patient, and Zhao et al. (2007),
who instead demonstrate that mentally simulating the future outcome improves the con-
sistency of agents’ preferences.
The second treatment (the Workshop Treatment) consists in exposing participants to a
one-hour workshop on the utility of saving. The workshop attracts the children’s attention
through a set of recreational and educational activities aimed at inducing them to think
about the benefits of saving more carefully (we discuss the structure of the workshop in
more details in Section 2).
In a related paper, Coda Moscarola and Migheli (2017) use the same Workshop Treat-
ment (in isolation) to evaluate whether educational activities of this kind are effective in
improving the consistency of children’s answers and their level of patience. They show
that attending the workshop contributes to increase the number of consistent answers of
boys but had no significant effects on girls.4 These results point to the existence of some
4Also the experiment conducted by Coda Moscarola and Migheli (2017) targets third and fourth graders
from elementary schools in the Turin area. However, there is no overlapping with the children that partic-
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gender differences in the way boys and girls approach and understand simple educational
activities of financial literacy. These differences can in turn contribute to create and amplify
the diverging patterns that men and women display in terms of financial participation and
decision-making. This led us to investigate whether gender-specific conceptual frames im-
pact on the level of attention that children devote to financial literacy activities, and thus
ultimately affect their performance and willingness to get engaged. Therefore, we combine
the Framing Treatment and the Workshop Treatment to study the intertwined effects of
framing and learning.
Overall, we find that the use of gender-specific conceptual frames: a) raises girls’ in-
terest and thus increases their number of consistent answers; b) makes the workshop on
the utility of saving more effective in boosting the consistency of the answers, once again
in particular for girls; and c) does not increase girls’ level of impatience. Although our
experiment targets elementary school children, we believe the results are relevant also for
the adult population. Our aim is to go to the roots of the gender gap in financial participa-
tion and decision-making: we show that gender-specific conceptual frames influence the
quality of financial decisions even for those who have been much less exposed to socio-
cultural conditioning factors. The effects of these factors pile up over time and are likely
to lead to long-term consequences. In fact, the literature on long-lasting effects of early life
exposures and interventions (see for instance Heckman and Karapakula 2019 and Eisner et
al. 2019) testifies the lifetime relevance of socio-emotional skills, attitudes and beliefs that
one acquires during childhood. Focusing on financial participation, Lusardi et al. (2010)
and Grohmann et al. (2015) show that individuals general attitude towards financial issues
is shaped by their childhood experiences. Therefore, and although it is certainly true that
ipated in our study as the two experiments took place in different academic years and involved different
schools and classes. Moreover, the two experiments feature different prizes: in Coda Moscarola and Migheli
(2017) children win candies; in our experiment, they win balloons. In Section 5, we discuss in greater detail
the results reported in Coda Moscarola and Migheli (2017) in light of the ones that we obtain.
7
financial preferences change with age, the interest that an individual has for these issues or
the way he/she approaches financial decisions is much more constant. This suggests that
the use of a more gender-specific conceptual frame – one women can identify more with –
in presenting financial information can indeed play a role in narrowing the gender gap in
financial market participation and decision-making. Van Rooij et al. (2011) show in fact that
those who have low financial literacy are significantly less likely to participate to financial
markets. Thus, as gender-specific conceptual frames influence women’s level of attention
and the quality of their choices, they will also impact on their level of participation.
The remaining part of the article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present our
experimental design. In Section 3, we show the descriptive statistics of our sample. In Sec-
tion 4, we present our empirical strategy. We illustrate and interpret the results in Section
5, and conclude in Section 6.
2. Experimental Design
The experiment involves 251 children from grade 3 and grade 4 (aged 8 and 9) belonging
to 12 different classes from 5 different elementary schools located in the metropolitan area
of Turin (Italy).5 The choice of the schools and of the classes is not random. Each year, the
Museo del Risparmio (“Museum of Saving”) di Torino – the institution we collaborated with in
the design of the experiment – invites third and fourth grade teachers to visit the museum
with their students and attend thematic workshops. Teachers receive similar invitations
from other sources and must thus choose where to bring their pupils. Our sample consists
of all the classes who visited the museum in the 2015-2016 academic year. We discuss the
5The city of Turin is divided into 8 districts (“circoscrizioni”, in Italian). Four of the five schools in the
sample are located in districts 3, 7, 8, and 9. The fifth school is located in Moncalieri, a city south of Turin.
See Costa et al. (2017) for a detailed description of the socio-economic conditions in the metropolitan area of
Turin. See Section 3 for more information on the distribution of population characteristics in our sample. See
Appendix A2 for more information on the schools and the classes.
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representativeness of the sample in Section 3.
As mentioned in the Introduction, during the experiment, the children are exposed to
two treatments: the Framing Treatment, which they repeat twice, and the Workshop Treat-
ment. In the former, the children are asked to perform a standard task aimed at eliciting
their time preferences. More precisely, they are asked to complete the Multiple Price List
(MPL) task shown in Figure 1.6
Option A Option B ANSWER
You receive ... tomorrow You receive ... in 1 month Do you prefer A or B?
Row 1 10 balloons 11 balloons
Row 2 10 balloons 12 balloons
Row 3 10 balloons 13 balloons
Row 4 10 balloons 14 balloons
Row 5 10 balloons 15 balloons
Row 6 10 balloons 16 balloons
Row 7 10 balloons 17 balloons
Row 8 10 balloons 18 balloons
Row 9 10 balloons 19 balloons
Row 10 10 balloons 20 balloons
Figure 1: The MPL task.
Children are introduced to the MPL task through the following three alternative con-
ceptual frames (see Appendix A1 for the original Italian texts).7
6As an incentive, once the children have completed the task, we extract a row number and assign each
child the prize corresponding to his/her choice at the appropriate deadline (i.e., the following day in the case
of Option A; a month later in the case of Option B). Analogous MPL tasks (and related incentive schemes) are
used, among others, in Bettinger and Slonim 2007, Andersen et al. 2008, Castillo et al. 2011, Sutter et al. 2013
and Alan and Ertac 2018.
7Edwards et al. (2001) highlight that, despite the fact that children’s preferences depend upon inclinations
and change over time, and are influenced by many factors (parents, teachers and media advertising, among
others), girls like games that include rhythm and singing more than boys do, while boys like competitive
games the most. See also Maccoby (1999) for a detailed psychological analysis about boys and girls having
different styles of play that are not attractive to each other. See Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), van den
Assem et al. (2011) and Molina et al. (2013) for experimental evidence on gender differences in cooperation
and competition.
9
1 - Masculine frame (emphasis on competitiveness and physical abilities).
Up for grabs, a lot of colorful balloons you can use to challenge your friends in exciting games and
races. For example, have you ever run a balloon race? You have to be agile, fast and clever. The
winner is the first to get to the finish line - but you can only use your nose to move the balloon.
2 - Feminine frame (emphasis on cooperation and empathy).
Up for grabs, a lot of colorful balloons to share with your friends and play fun games with them. For
example, have you ever done the back-to-back balloon dance? You have to be willing to share and
collaborate. You and your partner have to dance while holding two balloons in between your backs,
without letting the balloons fall or using your hands to help you.
3 - Neutral frame.
Up for grabs, a lot of colorful balloons to play fun games with.
The second treatment (the Workshop Treatment) consists in attending a one-hour work-
shop specifically designed for elementary school children by the Museo del Risparmio di
Torino. The workshop exposes children to a set of recreational activities aimed at empha-
sizing the usefulness and benefits of saving. It follows the insights of Becker and Mulligan
(1997) who show that stimulating children to imagine their future increases their propen-
sity to save. Children are thus initially asked to think about the utility deriving from some-
thing they really like and would love to buy (e.g., a toy). To make this mental exercise
effective, they are given sufficient time to think about what they really would like, and
then draw the desired object on a piece of paper.8 The experimenters then invite the chil-
dren to ponder the fact that to buy their desired object they need money, and tell them that
a way to gather the required sum could be doing chores for their parents and/or grandpar-
ents in exchange for pocket money. However, as it is not likely that they receive the money
8This phase lasts about 15 minutes and experimenters strictly avoid any potential influence on the chil-
dren’s desires.
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they need immediately, they will have to wait and save for some time. To reinforce the
message, children go through a second game which entails the creation of a small saving
plan. They look at a picture of an item (i.e., a camera or a bicycle) with the indication of its
market price. Then, they receive a calendar and a e5 or e10 facsimile banknote, as if this
amount was their weekly pocket money. However, as a single “instalment” is not enough
to buy the item, they realize they need more banknotes. So, they put the first banknote
on the first cell of the calendar. Then, they receive a second banknote and put it on the
second cell and so on, until they reach the required sum. The number of filled cells thus
represents the number of weeks they must save in order to be able to buy the item. To sum
up, the first part of the workshop is highly subjective as each child decides his/her own
object of desire. The second part is instead more homogeneous. However, as the overall
framework of the workshop is quite unstructured, we do not collect or analyze data about
its actual implementation. We simply use the children’s exposure to the workshop as the
treatment. The idea is that a child who attends the workshop gets somehow acquainted
with the benefits of saving.
All participants in the experiment go through two repetitions of the Framing Treatment
and one repetition of the Workshop Treatment, although in a different order. To clarify this
point, let M1, F1, N1, M0, F0, and N0 denote the six subgroups in which we partition the
pool of participants. The letter {M, F, N} identifies the frame to which the children are
exposed in the Framing Treatment (Masculine, Feminine, Neutral).9 The number {1, 0} in-
dicates whether the subgroup belongs to the treatment or the control group with respect
to the Workshop Treatment, that is whether participants went through the second repeti-
tion of the Framing Treatment after having attended the workshop (1 - treated) or not (0 -
control).10 Figure 2 illustrates the structure of the experiment. It also shows the number of
9The frame remains the same in both repetitions of the Framing Treatment.
10The subgroups consist of children belonging to different classes from different schools. See Tables 2, 3,
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boys and girls in each group. For instance, group M1 consists of 65 children, of which 39
are boys and 26 girls.
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Figure 2: Structure of the experiment.
Summing up across the groups, we thus see that about 75% of the subjects belongs to the
treatment group of the Workshop Treatment (groups M1, F1, and N1, 189 children out
of 251), whereas the remaining 25% (groups M0, F0, and N0, 62 children) constitutes the
control group.11 Summing up across the frames, we obtain the number of boys and girls
exposed to the masculine frame (groups M1 and M0), feminine frame (F1 and F0), or neu-
tral frame (groups N1 and N0) in the Framing Treatment. Table 1 gives these figures and
and 4 in Section 3 for the relevant summary statistics. See Appendix A2 for more details about the composi-
tion of the six subgroups.
11To make the visit to the Museo del Risparmio worthwhile, also the children in the control group attended
the workshop. However they did so only after having gone through the second repetition of the MPL task so
that the workshop could not affect their performance.
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shows that the sample is well-balanced also with regard to this dimension.
[TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
As for the timing and location of the experiment, all classes went through the first repetition
of the Framing Treatment (Phase 1 in Figure 2) between the 1st and 3rd of December 2015 on
the premises of the schools. Then all classes then went through Phase 2 (attendance at the
workshop and second repetition of the Framing Treatment - the two activities took place
on the same day) between the 9th and 21st of January 2016 on the premises of the Museo del
Risparmio di Torino.12
3. Descriptive Statistics
As mentioned above, 251 children took part in the experiment. Since each child repeated
the Framing Treatment twice, our balanced sample thus consists of 502 observations. Table
2 gives the descriptive statistics of the sample.13
The sample is gender-balanced (52% are boys and 48% are girls) with about 18% of
participants being non-Italian citizens. The parents’ level of education is in line with that
of the general population (OECD, 2014) with about 20% of parents having completed only
mandatory education (up to the age of 16) and 33% holding a university degree. As for
familiarity with managing money, about 20% of the children regularly receive some pocket
money from their parents, whereas 58% declare some savings.
12The fact that the experiment took place over December and January can potentially distort the children’s
savings attitude because of a “Christmas effect”. We think, however, that the prizes in the experiment (bal-
loons) are not close substitutes for the presents children received for Christmas, as the latter usually consist
of more valuable items such as toys, dolls and video games.
13We retrieved the information that appears in the table from a basic socio-demographic questionnaire
that we distributed to the children’s parents about a month before the experiment started. The number of
observations for some of these variables is less than 251 because of missing answers.
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[TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Table 3 compares the summary statistics conditional on the three conceptual frames used
in the Framing Treatment (i.e., groups M1 + M0 vs. F1 + F0 vs. N1 + N0). Each subgroup
presents a balanced gender composition and the table highlights only small differences in
the participants’ socio-economic characteristics.14
[TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Instead, Table 4 focuses on the comparison between the treatment group (subgroups F1, M1
and N1) and the control groups (F0, M0 and N0) with respect to the Workshop Treatment.
Here, we do find some differences in the educational level of the parents, in the children’s
math grade, and in the percentage of children receiving pocket money and having some
savings. This evidence suggests to control for these variables in the regression analysis that
we propose in Section 4.
[TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
3.1 The Dependent Variable
Our main variable of interest is the level of coherence in participants’ answers to the two
repetitions of the MPL task (see Figure 1). We encode individual answers in a string of 10
characters, e.g., AAAAAAAAAA, AAABBBBBBB, or ABBBAABBBB. We consider individ-
ual answers consistent when we observe one switching point between As and Bs at most,
14These differences are mostly related to the children’s grades in Math and to having their own savings.
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and the respondent never switches from B to A. Thus, the first two strings are examples
of consistent choices, while the third one is not. More precisely, the choices are consistent
when the child 1) always selects A, 2) always selects B, or 3) initially selects A and then
switches to B once and for all. Patterns 1 and 2 reveal, respectively, that the child always
prefers either the immediate or the delayed payment, whatever the actual interest rate. In-
stead, pattern 3 reveals that the child prefers immediate payment when the interest rate is
relatively low and delayed payment when it is sufficiently high.15
Table 5 shows the percentage of consistent answers in the sample. In the first repetition
of the Framing Treatment, this is about 44% among boys and 42% among girls. In the
second repetition, it increases to 64% among boys and 58% among girls. The difference
between the two repetitions is statistically significant, whereas the difference between the
performance of boys and girls is not.
[TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Inconsistency (and consistency) in the children’s answers is quite persistent across the
two repetitions of the MPL task (see Table 6). About 34% of the children provide consistent
answers in both repetitions, whereas 31% give inconsistent answers in both. Improvement,
i.e., the shift from inconsistent to consistent answers, involves 27% of the children, while
only 8% of them shifts from consistent to inconsistent answers.
[TABLE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
15Andersen et al. (2006) rationalize inconsistent answers that display multiple switching points by allowing
for the possibility that respondents are indifferent among some of the choices and thus randomize within that
set. Alan and Ertac (2018) report that some of the subjects who provided inconsistent answers declared not to
have properly understood the task. As mentioned before, in our experiment teachers unanimously confirmed
that the children have adequate cognitive abilities to understand the task. We thus interpret inconsistent
answers as a sign that the respondent did not pay attention during the introduction/explanation of the task
or had no interest in completing it.
15
Focusing on the 34% of the children who provide consistent answers in both repetitions
of the MPL task, Table 7 investigates whether these subjects differ in terms of the observ-
ables with respect to the rest of the population. Indeed, the table shows that students who
provide consistent answers in both repetitions of the MPL task show a lower incidence of
foreign citizens, have on average higher educated parents, and a bit more experience with
receiving pocket money and managing their own savings.
[TABLE 7 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
4. Empirical Strategy
We are interested in studying the (combined) effects of the Framing Treatment and the
Workshop Treatment on the level of consistency in the children’s answers. To elicit the
framing effect, we exploit the heterogeneity in the participants’ answers across the three dif-
ferent conceptual frames, masculine, feminine, and neutral (the latter is our control group).
To elicit the effect of the workshop, we analyze the variation that individual answers dis-
play over time, exploiting the fact that about 75% of the children attended the workshop
between the first and the second repetition of the MPL task while the remaining 25% did
not. The simplest specification of our model is as follows:
Yi,t = β0 + β1Time + β2Workshop + β3 (Time ∗Workshop) +
+ β4Mas f rame + β5Fem f rame + Xi,tγ+ ei + ui,t
(1)
where Yi,t takes value 1 if the answers of child i in repetition t ∈ {1, 2} of the MPL task are
consistent and value 0 otherwise. Time is a dummy that identifies the round of the MPL
task (Time = 0 for the first round, Time = 1 for the second round). It thus captures the
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learning effect due to the repetition of the task. Workshop is a dummy that identifies the
group to which the individual belongs in terms of the Workshop Treatment (Workshop = 1
for the treated group, i.e., those who went through the second repetition of the MPL task af-
ter having attended the workshop; and Workshop = 0 for the control group, i.e., those who
went through the second repetition of the task without having attended the workshop).
It thus captures the initial systematic differences between the two groups. The variable
Time ∗Workshop is the treatment dummy. If the estimated coefficient β3 is positive and
statistically significant, we can thus infer that attending the workshop improves the con-
sistency of the children’s answers. Moving to the effects of the Framing Treatment, the
dummies Mas f rame and Fem f rame identify the (masculine or feminine) frame to which the
child was exposed. If the estimated coefficients β4 and β5 are positive and significant, it
means that the use of gender-specific frames improves the consistency of the children’s
answers with respect to the neutral frame (omitted category). Finally, Xi,t is a set of ex-
planatory variables that includes information about the child’s gender (variables Boy and
Girl), level of education of his/her parents and their citizenship, whether the child receives
pocket money or has some savings, and his/her grade in Math.16 In order to control for the
school fixed effect, the set of regressors also includes dummies for the school.
In the course of the analysis, we progressively interact the variables of interest (Time,
Workshop, Time ∗Workshop, {Mas f rame, Fem f rame, Neut f rame}, {Boy, Girl}) such as to fi-
nally estimate a fully interacted model. This allows us to study how the two treatments
interact and thus evaluate how the gender-specific conceptual frames combine with the
effects triggered by attending the workshop. We model the error term to separately ac-
count for two individual-specific components. The first is a random effect that accounts
for all the unobserved individual characteristics that can influence the consistency of the
16A part from their gender - they were all women -, we did not collect information about the teachers as
they did not play any role in the explanation and implementation of the experiment.
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answers. These characteristics are assumed to be time-invariant and uncorrelated with the
other regressors. The second component varies over time and we cluster it at the class level
(class is the unit of randomization) in order to account for the presence of common factors
that may affect the children within each single class. We thus implement a generalized least
squares Logit. As robustness checks, we then replicate the analysis of the fully interacted
model through Probit, GLS with random effects and GLS with fixed effects.
We also run a second set of regressions aimed at investigating the determinants of the
children’s level of impatience. For these estimates, we focus on the subgroup of children
that provided consistent answers in both repetitions of the MPL task (refer to Table 7 to see
how these children compare with the rest of the population in terms of the observables). We
measure impatience as the number of A answers they provided (i.e., preferring 10 balloons
tomorrow rather than 10 + x in a month). We thus run a Logit and FE GLS on the same
set of variables as before, using as the dependent variable Ai,t, the number of A answers
which child i provided in repetition t ∈ {1, 2} of the task.
5. Results
Table 8 presents the estimation results of the Logit specification for the determinants of
the level of consistency of children’s answers. In each column, we use a different set of
explanatory variables and report the marginal effects.
[TABLE 8 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
The results show that the Workshop Treatment has a positive effect on the level of con-
sistency of the children’s answers. After the children have attended the workshop the prob-
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ability that they provide a consistent set of answers rises by 20 percentage points (see the
variable Workshop X Time in model (i), significance at 10%). As for the Framing Treatment,
gender-specific conceptual frames initially do not appear to be effective in increasing the
degree of consistency of individual answers (see the coefficients of the variables Masculine
frame and Feminine frame in model (i)). However, model (ii) shows that the interaction of the
feminine frame with the Workshop Treatment triggers a positive effect (variable Workshop
X Time X Fem. frame, coefficient of 0.379 significant at 1%); on the contrary, the analogous
effect of the masculine frame appears to be null (variable Workshop X Time X Masc. frame,
coefficient of 0.126 not significant).
The fully interacted model (model (iii)) further explores these relationships. It shows
that girls exposed to the feminine frame increase their probability of providing consistent
answers by about 53 percentage points when they attend the workshop (variable Workshop
X Time X Fem. frame X Girl, 0.529 significant at 1%). Probit, GLS with random effects, and
GLS with fixed effects estimates confirm the sign, size and significance of this coefficient
(see Table 9).17 The same result does not hold for what concerns the effects that the mascu-
line frame triggers on boys: the coefficient for the variable Workshop X Time X Mas. frame X
Boy remains statistically not significant across all specifications.18
[TABLE 9 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
17We perceive the results that stem out from GLS with fixed effects to be particularly solid as the specifica-
tion washes away all potential classes and experimenters fixed effects. In such specification (see column iii in
Table 9), the variable Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Girl is actually the only one that displays a significant
coefficient.
18The Logit model (Table 8) reports a negative effect of the neutral frame on boys (Workshop X Time X Neut.
frame X Boy). The effect remains significant, although smaller in size, in Probit but it vanishes and becomes in-
significant in RE GLS and FE GLS (Table 9). More in general, the neutral frame provides a possible benchmark
for comparing our results with those in Coda Moscarola and Migheli (2017). Coda Moscarola and Migheli
(2017) find that the workshop increased the number of consistent answers of boys but had no significant ef-
fects on girls. Our results confirm that the workshop leads to no significant effects on girls (variable Workshop
X Time X Neut. frame X Girl). The effect on boys instead ranges from negative to insignificant, depending on
the model specification. We attribute these differences to the fact that the two experiments, albeit similar, are
not identical. In particular, Coda Moscarola and Migheli (2017) do not use any frame (whereas our neutral
frame still provides a frame). Moreover, the two experiments assign different prizes (see footnote 3).
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Overall, the total effect of the experimental design on the level of consistency of chil-
dren’s answers (sum of a learning effect –captured by the variables Time X Masc./Fem./Neut.
frame– and a treatment effect –variables Workshop X Time X Masc./Fem./Neut. frame) appears
to be positive and statistically different from zero (see the pvalues tests at the end of Tables
8 and 9).
As for the other potential determinants of children’s level of consistency, all specifica-
tions of the fully interacted model (column iii in Table 8 and columns i and ii in Table 9)
provide coherent results.19 Receiving pocket money increases the probability of providing
consistent answers by about 13 percentage points. Indeed, pocket money can be considered
an educational tool that parents employ to teach their children how to manage money, a
sort of learning-by-doing experience.20 Unexpectedly, the Math grade is instead negatively
correlated with the consistency of the answers, as it reduces the probability of a consistent
answer by about 6 percentage points. This may depend on the fact that in Italian elemen-
tary schools the Math curriculum focuses more on arithmetic than logic. Finally, parents’
educational level plays an important role: having a father (resp. mother) with a university
degree instead of only mandatory education increases the probability of providing consis-
tent answers by about 21 (resp. 16) percentage points.
To complement the above results, we then explore the effect of our treatments on the
children’s level of impatience. We necessarily run such a test only on the subsample of
children providing consistent answers in both repetitions of the MPL task, i.e., on only
about 34% of the sample. The small sample size does not allow us to derive strong conclu-
sions. Moreover, we already know (see Table 7 and the discussion at the end of Section 3.1)
that these children have on average higher educated parents and slightly more experience
19Clearly, all these effects drop out in the FE GLS specification in Table 9 as they are fixed effects across
individuals.
20See Sansone et al. (2019) for evidence about the positive relation between receiving pocket money in
childhood and financial confidence in adulthood.
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with receiving pocket money and managing their own savings. Table 10 reports the esti-
mates of the fully interacted model under the Logit specifications (first three columns) and
the FE GLS specification (fourth column).
Logit estimates show that in general the treatment has no effect (variable Workshop X
Time in column i, 1.204 not significant). However, the interaction of the treatment with the
masculine frame (variable Workshop X Time X Masc. frame in column ii, 4.060 significant at
5%) increases impatience and this effect is driven by the way boys react to the frame (vari-
able Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Boy in column iii, 3.661 significant at 1%), possibly
because of the arousal effect triggered by the gender-specific framing. The significance of
this latter effect is confirmed by the FE GLS specification (4.267, significant at 10%, this is
the unique significant coefficient among those that interact the treatment with frames and
genders).21 In this respect, it is interesting to notice that the feminine frame does not trigger
a similar effect on girls. Thus, the positive effects that a gender-specific conceptual frame
brings on girls in terms of consistency of their answers does not come at the cost of increas-
ing their level of impatience. More in general, the total effect of the experimental design
on the level of impatience is never significantly different from zero, independently of the
frames (see the pvalues tests at the end of Table 10).
[TABLE 10 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
21The FE GLS specification also confirms that learning under the masculine frame decreases girls’ level of
impatience (variable Time X Masc. Frame X Girl), as already highlighted by the Logit specification (column 3).
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6. Conclusions
We provide field evidence on the effect of gender-specific conceptual frames on people’s
level of attention and quality of choices. Thaler and Sunstein (2009) demonstrate that the
way of presenting the potential utility of a task can serve as a “nudge” that alters people’s
behavior in the desired way, without precluding any option or changing significantly the
economic incentives embedded in the choice. In line with this view, we conjecture that
a more gender-specific approach in framing financial tasks could boost the attention and
interest of women, improve the quality of their answers, and thus ultimately impact on
their level of participation in financial markets. To address these issues, we run a field
experiment that targets elementary school children. We propose two treatments to boost
the attention of the children: a) one which is short, gender-specific and leverages on the
children’s instinctive reactions; and b) another which is longer, gender-neutral and edu-
cational. We measure the effects of these two treatments on both the consistency of the
children’s answers and their level of impatience. We find that gender-specific frames are
effective in increasing the number of consistent answers among girls only. Attending the
workshop has a comparable effect on both girls and boys but, upon closer inspection, the
gender-specific framing boosts the positive effect of the workshop only on girls. As for the
impact on the level of impatience, the feminine frame does not seem to affect girls’ level
of impatience. Our findings support the idea that a more gender-specific frame, one that
women can identify more with, may play a role in increasing their interest for financial ac-
tivities and thus contribute in narrowing the gender gap in financial market participation
and decision-making.
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Tables
Table 1: Framing Treatment by Gender.
Boys % wrt % wrt Girls % wrt % wrt total by % wrt
total boys total total girls total frame total
Masculine frame 47 36% 19% 36 30% 14% 83 33%
Feminine frame 43 33% 17% 42 35% 17% 85 34%
Neutral frame 41 31% 16% 42 35% 17% 83 33%
Total 131 100% 52% 120 100% 48% 251 100%
Notes: Each line reports the number of boys (first column) and girls (second column) exposed to
the three contextual frames (masculine, feminine, and neutral), together with the relevant percent-
age values.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample.
All Boys Girls
Obs Mean St. Dev. Obs Mean St. Dev. Obs Mean St. Dev.
Girls 251 0.48 0.50 131 0.00 0.00 120 1.00 0.00
Foreign citizen 251 0.18 0.38 131 0.17 0.38 120 0.18 0.39
Mother mandatory school 231 0.22 0.41 121 0.21 0.41 110 0.22 0.41
Mother high school diploma 231 0.38 0.49 121 0.36 0.48 110 0.39 0.49
Mother university degree 231 0.34 0.47 121 0.34 0.48 110 0.34 0.47
Father mandatory school 223 0.18 0.39 116 0.18 0.39 107 0.19 0.39
Father high school diploma 223 0.43 0.50 116 0.44 0.50 107 0.42 0.50
Father university degree 223 0.32 0.47 116 0.30 0.46 107 0.34 0.47
Math grade 237 8.48 1.04 125 8.42 1.11 112 8.56 0.95
Pocket money 251 0.20 0.40 131 0.22 0.42 120 0.18 0.39
Own savings 251 0.58 0.49 131 0.61 0.49 120 0.55 0.50
Notes: Foreign citizenship and Math grades are reported by teachers. Receiving pocket money and
having some savings are reported by the children. All other variables are reported by the children’s
parents through a written questionnaire.
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Table 3: Comparison among Groups Exposed to the 3 Frames in the Framing Treatment.
Masculine frame (M) Feminine frame (F) Neutral frame (N) Ho:Diff=0 (P-values)
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. M-F F-N M-N
Girls 83 0.43 0.50 85 0.49 0.50 83 0.51 0.50 0.44 0.88 0.35
Foreign citizen 83 0.17 0.38 85 0.13 0.34 83 0.23 0.42 0.48 0.09 0.33
Mother mandatory school 79 0.25 0.44 80 0.19 0.39 72 0.21 0.41 0.32 0.75 0.52
Mother high school diploma 79 0.29 0.46 80 0.42 0.50 72 0.42 0.50 0.08 0.92 0.11
Mother university degree 79 0.35 0.48 80 0.35 0.48 72 0.31 0.46 0.95 0.56 0.53
Father mandatory school 76 0.18 0.39 79 0.19 0.39 68 0.18 0.38 0.93 0.84 0.90
Father high school diploma 76 0.45 0.50 79 0.38 0.49 68 0.47 0.50 0.40 0.27 0.78
Father university degree 76 0.33 0.47 79 0.34 0.48 68 0.28 0.45 0.87 0.42 0.52
Math grade 83 8.64 1.11 71 8.25 1.09 83 8.53 0.87 0.03 0.08 0.49
Pocket money 83 0.25 0.44 85 0.16 0.37 83 0.19 0.40 0.16 0.64 0.35
Own savings 83 0.65 0.48 85 0.60 0.49 83 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.17 0.04
Notes: The last three columns report the t-test on means with unequal variances between the masculine
and feminine frames, the feminine and neutral, and the masculine and neutral, respectively.
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Table 4: Comparison among Treated and Control Groups wrt the Workshop Treatment.
Treated Control Ho:Diff=0
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. P-values
Girls 189 0.46 0.50 62 0.53 0.50 0.33
Foreign citizen 189 0.19 0.39 62 0.13 0.34 0.24
Mother mandatory school 172 0.21 0.41 59 0.24 0.43 0.66
Mother high school diploma 172 0.35 0.48 59 0.44 0.50 0.25
Mother university degree 172 0.38 0.49 59 0.22 0.42 0.02
Father mandatory school 166 0.15 0.36 57 0.28 0.45 0.05
Father high school diploma 166 0.48 0.50 57 0.30 0.46 0.02
Father university degree 166 0.31 0.47 57 0.33 0.48 0.78
Math grade 179 8.41 1.05 58 8.72 0.97 0.04
Pocket money 189 0.16 0.37 62 0.32 0.47 0.02
Own savings 189 0.54 0.50 62 0.69 0.46 0.03
Notes: The last column reports the t-test on means with unequal variances between those who at-
tended the workshop before the second repetition of the MPL task (the treated group, 189 individu-
als) and those who instead attended the workshop only after the second repetition of the MPL task
(the control group, 62 individuals).
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Table 5: Consistency in Individual Answers by Gender and Time.
Consistent answers Boys (131) Girls (120) Ho: Diff=0
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. p-values
First repetition 57 0.435 0.043 50 0.417 0.045 0.769
Second repetition 84 0.641 0.042 69 0.575 0.045 0.285
Ho: diff=0 (p-values) 0.001 0.014
Notes: The two columns reports the number of boys (first column, total 131) and girls (second
column, total 120) who provided consistent answers in the first and second repetition of the
MPL task.
Table 6: Persistence in Consistency/Inconsistency by Gender and Time.
All (251) Boys (131) Girls (120)
Yi,1 = 1 and Yi,2 = 1 34% 35% 33%
Yi,1 = 0 and Yi,2 = 0 31% 27% 35%
Yi,1 = 0 and Yi,2 = 1 27% 30% 24%
Yi,1 = 1 and Yi,2 = 0 8% 8% 8%
Notes: Yi,t = 1 indicates that in the tth repetition of the MPL task (t ∈ 1, 2) individual i pro-
vided a consistent answer. Yi,t = 0 indicates that he/she instead provided an inconsistent
answer.
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Table 7: Comparison between Consistent and Inconsistent Individuals.
Consistent Inconsistent Ho:Diff=0
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. P-values
Girls 86 0.47 0.50 165 0.48 0.50 0.77
Foreign citizen 86 0.10 0.31 165 0.21 0.41 0.03
Mother mandatory school 84 0.15 0.36 147 0.25 0.44 0.09
Mother high school diploma 84 0.37 0.49 147 0.38 0.49 0.86
Mother university degree 84 0.42 0.50 147 0.29 0.46 0.06
Father mandatory school 81 0.17 0.38 142 0.19 0.39 0.75
Father high school diploma 81 0.35 0.48 142 0.48 0.5 0.05
Father university degree 81 0.42 0.50 142 0.26 0.44 0.01
Math grade 83 8.55 0.93 154 8.45 1.09 0.45
Pocket money 86 0.29 0.46 165 0.16 0.37 0.01
Own savings 86 0.69 0.47 165 0.53 0.50 0.02
Notes: The last column reports the t-test on means with unequal variances between those who pro-
vided consistent answers in both repetitions of the MPL task and those who instead provided incon-
sistent answers in at least one of the two repetitions.
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Table 8: RE Logit on Consistency of Individual Answers (Margins)
(i) (ii) (iii)
Time 0.026
(0.091)
Workshop -0.437***
(0.073)
Workshop X Time 0.202*
(0.109)
Masculine frame -0.070
(0.078)
Feminine frame -0.021
(0.081)
Time X Masc. frame 0.044
(0.090)
Time X Fem. frame -0.138**
(0.057)
Time X Neut. frame 0.357***
(0.061)
Workshop X Masc. frame -0.485***
(0.086)
Workshop X Fem. frame -0.354***
(0.080)
Workshop X Neutr. frame -0.446***
(0.091)
Workshop X Time X Masc. frame 0.126
(0.115)
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame 0.379***
(0.091)
Workshop X Time X Neutr. frame -0.078
(0.090)
Time X Masc. frame X Girl -0.031
(0.067)
Time X Fem. frame X Girl -0.210***
(0.040)
Time X Neut. frame X Girl 0.134***
(0.041)
Time X Masc. frame X Boy 0.134*
(0.076)
Time X Fem. frame X Boy 0.008
(0.045)
Time X Neut. frame X Boy 2.509***
(0.289)
Workshop X Masc. frame X Girl -0.427***
(0.122)
Workshop X Fem. frame X Girl -0.271***
(0.096)
Workshop X Neut. frame X Girl -0.395***
(0.061)
Workshop X Masc. frame X Boy -0.370***
(0.085)
Workshop X Fem. frame X Boy -0.297***
(0.075)
Workshop X Neut. frame X Boy -0.330***
(0.104)
Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Girl 0.111
(0.088)
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Girl 0.529***
(0.080)
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Girl 0.119
(0.090)
Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Boy 0.039
(0.141)
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Boy 0.097
(0.124)
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Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Boy -2.316***
(0.284)
Girls -0.031 -0.034
(0.051) (0.050)
Foreign citizen -0.003 0.014 0.013
(0.096) (0.098) (0.076)
Maths grade -0.071*** -0.069*** -0.058***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.019)
Mother high school diploma 0.104 0.102 0.085
(0.083) (0.083) (0.067)
Mother university degree 0.187 0.195* 0.161*
(0.123) (0.118) (0.096)
Father high school diploma 0.051 0.057 0.041
(0.103) (0.104) (0.081)
Father university degree 0.271** 0.269** 0.210**
(0.111) (0.107) (0.085)
Pocket money 0.142** 0.161** 0.130**
(0.065) (0.065) (0.052)
Own savings 0.037 0.024 0.026
(0.086) (0.080) (0.066)
Schools dummies yes yes yes
Observations 420 420 420
test(pvalue)
Workshop X Time X Masc. frame+Time X Masc. frame=0 0.0297
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame+Time X Fem. frame=0 0.0044
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame+Time X Neut. frame=0 0.0006
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Girl=Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Girl 0.0009
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Girl=Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Girl 0.0003
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Boy=Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Boy 0.0000
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Boy=Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Boy 0.0000
Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Girl+Time X Masc. frame X Girl=0 0.1937
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Girl+Time X Fem. frame X Girl=0 0.0000
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Girl+Time X Neut. frame X Girl=0 0.0081
Workshop XTime X Masc. frame X Boy+Time X Masc. frame X Boy=0 0.1582
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Boy+Time X Fem. frame X Boy=0 0.3915
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Boy+Time X Neut. frame X Boy=0 0.0000
Notes: Balanced panel. Error terms clustered at class level. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: p* 0.10, p** 0.05, p*** 0.01. Omitted variables: Neutral frame, Boys, Mother
mandatory school, Father mandatory school.
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Table 9: RE Probit, RE GLS and FE GLS on Consistency of Individual Answers (Margins)
(i) (ii) (iii)
Time X Masc. frame X Girl 0.008 -0.027 -0.100
(0.090) (0.069) (0.176)
Time X Fem. frame X Girl -0.222*** -0.217*** -0.200
(0.057) (0.040) (0.176)
Time X Neut. frame X Girl 0.124** 0.081** 0.111
(0.058) (0.039) (0.186)
Time X Masc. frame X Boy 0.202* 0.114 0.000
(0.107) (0.077) (0.211)
Time X Fem. frame X Boy -0.037 0.015 0.111
(0.066) (0.046) (0.186)
Time X Neut. frame X Boy 1.438*** 0.222*** 0.250
(0.126) (0.044) (0.197)
Workshop X Masc. frame X Girl -0.421*** -0.441***
(0.119) (0.130)
Workshop X Fem. frame X Girl -0.268*** -0.273***
(0.092) (0.099)
Workshop X Neut. frame X Girl -0.382*** -0.410***
(0.066) (0.065)
Workshop X Masc. frame X Boy -0.370*** -0.378***
(0.087) (0.098)
Workshop X Fem. frame X Boy -0.298*** -0.300***
(0.077) (0.083)
Workshop X Neut. frame X Boy -0.322*** -0.339***
(0.104) (0.120)
Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Girl 0.065 0.110 0.183
(0.103) (0.091) (0.210)
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Girl 0.557*** 0.550*** 0.533**
(0.086) (0.070) (0.214)
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Girl 0.123 0.189** 0.158
(0.091) (0.094) (0.216)
Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Boy -0.019 0.086 0.200
(0.161) (0.160) (0.231)
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Boy 0.141 0.096 -0.000
(0.125) (0.135) (0.215)
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Boy -1.247*** -0.014 -0.042
(0.132) (0.061) (0.228)
Maths grade -0.059*** -0.058***
(0.020) (0.021)
Mother high school diploma 0.082 0.081
(0.066) (0.069)
Mother university degree 0.157* 0.156
(0.095) (0.102)
Father high school diploma 0.036 0.030
(0.079) (0.085)
Father university degree 0.214*** 0.205**
(0.082) (0.091)
Pocket money 0.126** 0.119**
(0.051) (0.053)
Own savings 0.027 0.029
(0.065) (0.072)
Foreign citizen 0.014 0.007
(0.075) (0.080)
Constant 0.951*** 0.467***
(0.170) (0.027)
Schools dummies yes yes yes
Observations 420 420 420
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test(pvalue)
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Girl=Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Girl 0.0007 0.0018
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Girl=Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Girl 0.0001 0.0001
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Boy=Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Boy 0.0000 0.5296
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Boy=Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Boy 0.0000 0.4233
Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Girl+Time X Masc. frame X Girl=0 0.1588 0.1648 0.4651
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Girl+Time X Fem. frame X Girl=0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0067
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Girl+Time X Neut. frame X Girl=0 0.0094 0.0064 0.0147
Workshop XTime X Masc. frame X Boy+Time X Masc. frame X Boy=0 0.1419 0.1560 0.0352
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Boy+Time X Fem. frame X Boy=0 0.3876 0.4131 0.3020
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Boy+Time X Neut. frame X Boy=0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0688
Notes: Balanced panel. Error terms clustered at class level. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: p* 0.10, p** 0.05, p*** 0.01. Omitted variables: Neutral frame, Boys, Mother
mandatory school, Father mandatory school.
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Table 10: RE Logit and FE GLS on Children’s Revealed Impatience Rate
(i) (ii) (iii) GLS
Time -1.516
(0.986)
Workshop -1.605*
(0.888)
Workshop X Time 1.204
(1.227)
Masculine frame -1.664***
(0.638)
Feminine frame -1.667**
(0.770)
Time X Masc. frame -3.417***
(0.168)
Time X Fem. frame -0.191
(0.876)
Time X Neut. frame -0.388
(0.491)
Workshop X Masc. frame -2.956**
(1.505)
Workshop X Fem. frame -0.992
(1.296)
Workshop X Neut. frame -1.502*
(0.913)
Workshop X Time X Masc. frame 4.060**
(1.613)
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame -1.420
(1.448)
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame 0.701
(0.648)
Time X Masc. frame X Girl -4.482*** -3.857***
(0.192) (1.547)
Time X Fem. frame X Girl -0.669 0.000
(0.919) (2.047)
Time X Neut. frame X Girl 0.012 -1.167
(0.466) (1.671)
Time X Masc. frame X Boy -1.994*** -2.600
(0.250) (1.831)
Time X Fem. frame X Boy 0.398 1.667
(1.157) (2.364)
Time X Neut. frame X Boy -0.708 -0.833
(0.653) (1.671)
Workshop X Masc. frame X Girl -1.684
(2.686)
Workshop X Fem. frame X Girl -2.339*
(1.315)
Workshop X Neut. frame X Girl -2.856***
(0.894)
Workshop X Masc. frame X Boy -3.265*
(1.820)
Workshop X Fem. frame X Boy 0.102
(1.584)
Workshop X Neut. frame X Boy -0.065
(1.505)
Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Girl 3.282 2.657
(2.759) (2.397)
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Girl -2.831 -3.500
(2.256) (2.507)
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Girl 2.273*** 3.452
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(0.859) (2.278)
Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Boy 3.661*** 4.267*
(1.223) (2.284)
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Boy -0.498 -1.767
(1.092) (2.695)
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Boy -0.514 -0.389
(1.465) (2.158)
Girls -1.254 -1.267
(0.866) (0.888)
Foreign citizen 2.283* 2.044 1.844
(1.335) (1.262) (1.236)
Maths grade 0.217 0.243 0.481
(0.355) (0.356) (0.322)
Mother high school diploma 1.720 1.751 1.426
(1.199) (1.192) (1.208)
Mother university degree -0.270 -0.351 -0.858
(1.640) (1.712) (1.491)
Father high school diploma 0.367 0.695 1.454
(1.568) (1.528) (1.696)
Father university degree -0.777 -0.436 -0.078
(1.065) (1.041) (1.004)
Pocket money 0.441 0.450 0.549
(0.538) (0.555) (0.477)
Own savings 0.616 0.473 0.400
(1.426) (1.465) (1.538)
Constant 7.115* 5.125 3.240 5.722***
(3.841) (3.696) (3.860) (0.326)
Schools dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 158 158 158 158
test(pvalue)
Workshop X Time X Masc. frame+Time X Masc. frame=0 0.6821
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame+Time X Fem. frame=0 0.1400
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame+Time X Neut. frame=0 0.4653
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Girl=Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Girl 0.0245
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Girl=Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Girl 0.0826
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Boy=Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Boy 0.0225
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Boy=Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Boy 0.9929
Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Girl+Time X Masc. frame X Girl=0 0.6585
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Girl+Time X Fem. frame X Girl=0 0.1130
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Girl+Time X Neut. frame X Girl=0 0.0037
Workshop X Time X Masc. frame X Boy+Time X Masc. frame X Boy=0 0.1560
Workshop X Time X Fem. frame X Boy+Time X Fem. frame X Boy=0 0.6334
Workshop X Time X Neut. frame X Boy+Time X Neut. frame X Boy=0 0.3403
Notes: Balanced panel. Error terms clustered at class level. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: p* 0.10, p** 0.05, p*** 0.01. Omitted variables: Neutral frame, Boys, Mother mandatory school,
Father mandatory school.
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Appendix
A1. Introductory Statements in Italian
1 - Masculine frame
In palio tanti palloncini per sfidare chi volete voi in giochi e gare avvincenti. Volete un esempio?
Avete mai fatto la corsa dei palloncini? Dovete essere agili, veloci e astuti. Vince chi arriva primo al
traguardo spingendo il palloncino solo con il naso.
2 - Feminine frame
In palio tanti palloncini da condividere con chi volete per fare insieme giochi divertenti. Volete un
esempio? Avete mai fatto il ballo del palloncino? Dovete essere bravi a collaborare. Si gioca a coppie
e, tenendo tra le vostre schiene due palloncini, dovete ballare senza farli cadere e senza mai aiutarvi
con le mani.
3 - Neutral frame
In palio tanti palloncini per fare giochi divertenti.
A2. Composition of the Subgroups
The subgroups of the participants in the experiment (see also Figure 2) are assembled as
follows. The name indicates the school, the number refers to the school year, and the letter
to the class. The number in brackets refers to the number of children in the class.
• M1 = {Palmieri 3A (23), Palmieri 3D (21), Collodi 4A (21)}
• F1 = {Marconi 3B (21), Palmieri 3B (22), Pertini 3C (19)}
• N1 = {Collodi 3B (22), Marco Polo 3A (21), Palmieri 3C (19)}
• M0 = {Marco Polo 4A (18)}
• F0 = {Marconi 3A (23)}
• N0 = {Palmieri 3E (21)}
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Palmieri elementary school is located in district 3 of the city of Turin, Marconi elementary
school is located in district 7, Collodi elementary school is located in district 8, Pertini ele-
mentary school is located in district 9, and Marco Polo elementary school is located in the
city of Moncalieri, a city immediately south of Turin (see footnote 3). In terms of average
income, the areas where these schools are located provide a reasonable mix; Palmieri is in
an affluent neighborhood, Marco Polo is in a working-class neighborhood, while Marconi,
Collodi and Pertini are in middle-class neighborhoods.
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